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The Slow Recovery
The real gross domestic product (GOP) declined
from the second quarter of 1990 through the first
quarter of 1991. Although the U.S. has had posi-
tive GOP growth since then, a lot of people find
it hard to label this period an unqualified recov-
ery. Certainly it is not like the typical recovery: in
the last four recoveries real GOP has been up 5.8
percent, on average, after five quarters, but this
time it has increased only 2.0 percent. Hence,
this recovery has been described as "anemic;'
"fragile;' or "weak"-words usually associated
with sickroom reports.
What is behind this performance? Why is this re-
covery different from others? This Vleekly Lettei
analyzes the recovery in terms of a structural
economic model in order to identify the sectors
of the economy where the weakness has been
the greatest and then suggests some of the im-
plications for the economic outlook.
Framework of analysis
Like all structural economic models, the model
discussed here has some exogenous, or prede-
termined, variables and other variables that are
endogenous, or dependent upon the operation of
the system as a whole (for details, see Throop
1989). The most important exogenous variables
in the model are monetary policy, fiscal policy,
and the population. Foreign real GOP also is
treated as exogenous, even though it is influ-
enced by u.s. real GOP through the u.s. de-
mand for imports. Examples of the endogenous
variables are income, consumption spending,
investment spending, exports, and imports. Any
change in the exogenous variables influences the
GOP indirectly through the endogenous varia-
bles, as well as perhaps directly. For example,
a change in government spending affects GOP
indirectly through income and consumption, as
well as directly. Because endogenous variables
are influenced by exogenous variables, gross
movements in the endogenous variables them-
selves are not a good guideto the ultimate
causes of movements in GOP. For example,
weak consumption spending would not be an
underlying cause of weak GOP growth if it had
been generated by weak income growth that
was, in turn, due to a decline in some exogenous
variable like government spending.
We therefore account for the ultimate sources of
real GOP growth by decomposing it into two
parts. The first part is the portion caused by
changes in the exogenous variables. The second
part is the portion due to departures of the en-
dogenous variables from their normal relation-
ships to the exogenous variables. This second
part is measured by changes in the "errors" (that
is, differences between actual and predicted val-
ues) of the model equations that explain the en-
dogenous variables. Although this approach by
itself does' not provide reasons for errors in pre-
dicting the endogenous variables, it at least
allows us to distinguish between the effects of
policy variables, other exogenous variables, and
any unusual behavior of the endogenous vari-
ables. This information may provide clues as
to the underlying causes of the recent slow
economic growth.
Exogenous variables
Looking first at monetary policy, we find that the
decline in short-term interest rates has been at
least as large as the average of previous recov-
eries. Before the recenttrough in economic
activity, short-term interest rates as measured by
the federal funds rate fell less than they did in
earlier cycles. But since then they have declined
by more.
Other exogenous variables have contributed to
the slowness of the recovery, however. First, the
adult population has grown by 1.2 percent in this
recovery, compared with 2.3 percent, on aver-
age, over the same time period in previous
recoveries. Lower population growth affects the
size of the trend against which the cyclical ex-
pansion should be measured (see Trehan 1992).'
The reduction in the growth of labor input re-
duced the trend in the growth of output by 0.7
percentage point.FRBSF
A second exogenous factOi that has slowed
growth in the current recovery is federal fiscal
policy. Real federal purchases of goods and serv-
ices declined by 0.4 percent of the trough real
GOP in the current recovery, primarily due to
cutbacks in defense spending, whereas in past
recoveries federal purchases changed very little.
Since federal taxes net oftransfer payments
measured on a high employment basis changed
about as much as in previous recoveries, federal
fiscal policy as a whole had a net contractionary
effect on total spending compared with previous
recoveries. In addition to the direct effect of fed-
eral spending in GOp, there were secondary
effects on consumption and investment due to
lower incomes.
The endogenous variables with the most signifi-
cant effects on real GOP compared with past
recoveries are imports and inventory investment.
Nonpetroleum imports have grown by 12 percent
in real terms in the current recovery. But on the
basis of past relationships with U.s. GOP and the
dollar, we would have expected them to grow by
only3 percent. In past recoveries, nonpetroleum
imports have behaved normally in relation to U.S.
GOP and the dollar. But in the current recovery
the growing "error" in nonpetroleum imports
relative to that in previous recoveries directly
reduced the demand for U.s. output by 0.8 per-
cent of the trough GOP (Chart 1). Significantly, no
similar error emerged in the model's equation for

















Yet another factor that has reduced real GOP
growth in the current recovery is foreign real
GOP, which has grown at only half the rate of
previous. recoveries. Since the recent tiough, real
GOP in our trading partners has grown by only
2.7 percent compared with 5.6 percent average
growth in past recoveries. It is estimated that this
reduced u.s. exports by 0.5 percent of the trough
GOP, with further secondary effects on income,
consumption, and investment. Although a por-
tion of the slow growth in foreign real GOP was
simply a response to slower U.s. growth, the
largest part probably was not.
(Quarters from Trough)
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An even bigger source of slow growth has been
relatively weak inventory investment (Chart 2).
The model contains a standard equation for in-
ventory investment, in which this investment
is explained by the current level of sales and
the existing stock of inventories. This equation
tracks inventory investment reasonably well
when growth is stable. But in the early phases of
recovery when expected sales tend to exceed
current sales, inventory investment is usually
stronger than predicted by the model. The pat-
tern in the current recovery is strikingly different,
however. Nonfarm inventory investment has
been about the same as the model's predictions,
and thus weaker than is typical at this phase of
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Residential investment also does not appear
to be a source of the problem. It has grown
somewhat faster than predicted by population,
incomes, interest rates and the existing stock of
housing than in previous recoveries. Nonresiden-
tial investment, however, has grown more slowly
than predicted by finai sales, the cost of capital,
and the stock of equipment and structures.
Endogenous variables
Turning to the endogenous variables, the rela-
tionship of total consumption expenditures to
income and wealth has not differed much from
previous recoveries. While consumer sentiment
dropped precipitously in the fourth quarter of last
year and temporarily reduced consumer spend-
ing, apparently in response to a spate of bad
news in the media, by the spring it was on track
once again with economic fundamentals and so
did not depress the growth of consumer expendi-
tures over the whole recovery to date.(Quarters from Trough)
Looking to the future, cutbacks in defense spend-
ing that are contributing to a restrictive fiscal pol-
icy are likely to continue. Foreign GOP growth
is picking up and boosting the rate of export
growth, but not to the same extent as in the past.
Import growth has begun to slow tothe pace of
past recoveries. But inventory investment likely
will continue to expand no faster than sales. This
adds up to a moderately stronger recovery than
we have seen so far.
Adrian W. Throop
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In addition, significant effects from monetary pol-
icy are still in the pipeline. Short-term interest
rates are now at their lowest levels since the
19605, and the gap between long~term rates and
short-term rates is still quite wide. It takes time
for the financial markets to alter their expecta-
tions of future short rates, and for long-term rates
to move more closely into line with current short-
term rates. But that process will continue. As it
does, both nominal and real long-term interest
rates can be expected to decline further, contrib-
uting to a more vigorous recovery than seen
heretofore.




the cycle. Possible explanations are that business
confidence has suffered for lack of clear evidence
of a strong recovery and that new management
techniques have allowed inventories to be kept
under relatively tight control. The difference be-
tween the current error and the average error at
this stage of previous recoveries is equal to 1.1
percent of the trough real GOP.
Cumuiative Change













The sources of the slow recovery are several.
Lower population growth has diminishedthe
growth potential of the economy somewhat;
and federal fiscal policy, foreign GOP growth,
stronger imports, and subdued inventory invest-
ment all have diminished growth in demand
relative to previous recoveries.
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